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Critical Perspectives on Intervention: 
Thoughts in Response to Professor 
Richardson’s Keynote Lecture 
 
MAXWELL O. CHIBUNDU † 
 
INTRODUCTION 
“No man is an island, Entire of itself, Every man is a piece of the 
continent, A part of the main.”1 
“I trust the president. I like the president. I think he's doing the 
right thing. We cannot allow thugs like Assad to gas his own 
people.”2 
 As I write this response to Professor Henry Richardson’s rousing 
reflections on the problem of interventions in civil strife,3 two stories 
running side by side in the popular press capture the complexities of 
the problem. In the first, a piece of national legislation in Uganda that 
criminalizes homosexuality understandably has not only drawn the 
protests and ire of “gay rights activists” in the West, but also has 
seemingly generated consequential punitive actions by Western 
governments including the withdrawal or suspension of development 
assistance to the Ugandan state.4 Of particular note, the World Bank, 
an institution currently run by a medical doctor and whose policies 
are shaped in Washington, D. C., reportedly has “suspended,” as a 
 
† Professor of Law, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of 
Law.  The author wishes to express his gratitude to his students and the editors of 
the Maryland Journal of International Law for the opportunity to reflect on the 
thoughts expressed in this commentary and for their editorial help. 
1. JOHN DONNE, NO MAN IS AN ISLAND 1 (Keith Fallon ed., 1970). 
2. Eliot Engel, PBS Newshour (PBS television broadcast Aug. 30, 2013), 
available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/world-july-dec13-syria2_08-30/. 
3. See See Henry J. Richardson III, Critical Perspectives on Intervention, 
29 MD. J. INT’L L. 12 (2014). 
4. See, e.g., Alan Cowell, Uganda’s President Signs Antigay Bill, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 25, 2014, at A9. 
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response to the Ugandan legislation, the disbursement of $90,000,000 
of financial assistance already promised to the health sector of 
Ugandan society.5 But since the “state” has no corporeal existence, 
the consequences of the suspension apparently will be visited 
primarily on the children, mothers and HIV patients who depend on 
government-funded centers for their health-care needs.6 The second 
story is the dramatic denouement of a long-running strife within the 
Ukrainian state.  Shortly after Professor Richardson delivered his 
lecture, fissures in Ukrainian society evident as early as 2004 in the 
so-called “Orange revolution” reasserted themselves with renewed 
vigor.7 In November 2013, a significant portion of Ukrainian society 
began demonstrating against the policies of their Government 
regarding the scope of and choices in the relationships of the 
Ukrainian state and its two powerful neighbors: Russia and the 
European Union.8 The street demonstrations ultimately led to the 
downfall of the then existing government, and fears of the carving up 
of the Ukrainian state into spheres of territorial influence—if not 
outright partition—between the “West” (as represented by the 
European Union” and Russia.9   
What I find striking (and preliminarily wish to highlight here), is 
less the admittedly absorbing drama of the Ukrainian conflict, but 
rather the rhetoric of “nonintervention” coming out of Washington. 
That rhetoric which “warns” Russia not to “intervene” in matters that 
are purportedly about the “sovereignty,” territorial integrity, political 
independence and “democratic” practices of Ukraine,10 is in 
significant contrast to the calls for and policies of direct and 
unapologetic intervention in Syria. As the Syrian civil war has 
unfolded, politicians, and pundits in the United States (or, for that 
 
5. Danielle Douglas, Here is Why the World Bank Withheld Aid to Uganda, 
WASH. POST (Apr. 3, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2 
014/04/03/here-is-why-the-world-bank-withheld-aid-to-uganda/. 
6. Uganda Says Healthcare is For All Despite Anti-Gay Law, BBC NEWS, 
(Feb. 25, 2014, 9:47 PM), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26349166 
(predicting consequences for withholding aid).  
7. David M. Herszenhorn, Ukraine in Turmoil After Leaders Reject Major E.U. 
Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2013, at A6. 
8. Id. 
9. David M. Herszenhorn, As Ukrainian Election Looms, Western Powers and 
Russia Campaign for Influence, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2014, at A4. 
10. Andrew Higgins & David M. Herszenhorn, U.S. and NATO Warn Russia 
Against Further Intervention in Ukraine, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2014, at A4; 
President Barack Obama, Statement on Ukraine (Feb. 28, 2014) (“It would be a 
clear violation of Russia’s commitment to respect the independence and 
sovereignty and borders of Ukraine, and of international laws.”). 
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matter, the West in general) have not framed the issue of external 
involvement in that strife-torn country as one of interference in the 
political independence or territorial integrity of the Syrian state or 
indeed of Syrian society. The various interventions that they advocate 
have been justified by appeals to pragmatic geopolitical 
considerations or claims about morally correct “humanitarian” 
policies. Indeed, remarkable by its absence from the vocabulary has 
been reference to international law rules; and this is so, even when 
resort to Security Council Resolutions have been sought.  (At least 
this was the case until President Barack Obama’s anticlimactic 
August 31, 2013 speech).11 
The following Response reviews and comments on the issue of 
intervention in three parts. Part I outlines three possible prisms 
through which the question can be viewed.  The summary seeks to 
point out in a descriptive sense the nature of the distinctions and the 
connections that are inherent in any attempt at a systematic 
comprehension of the subject matter of intervention. By setting out 
the various prisms through which the idea of intervention can be 
explored, this Part should be considered as an argument for 
subjecting the presumed objectivity of an academic statement to the 
tests of the validity of its underlying assumptions, the cohesion of the 
internal elements of the claim, and the reliability of those claims vis-
à-vis outside realities.  Parsing the prisms of intervention makes 
possible a nuanced evaluation of the competing claims for its 
appropriateness in varied settings, even if ultimately one concludes 
that myopia as to one or more of these lenses is the better approach. 
The second part of the essay employs the lens of the legal—more 
specifically of international law—to illuminate the dimensions of the 
problem of “intervention” and “nonintervention” as currently 
embedded in international politics. The presentation here eschews the 
objective sounding monocular focus on “the international 
community” which tends to obscure the nature of the problem.12 
Rather, the approach invites the reader to consider the relevant issues 
from two perspectives that should be but which are rarely juxtaposed 
in the discussion:  that from within and from without a strife-torn 
 
11. I take up this disparity below.  See infra 76–77. 
12. Cf. Richardson, supra note 3, at 12 (“Our current inquiry about 
intervention must start with the global community.  It is a community in its 
comprehensive empirical, factual linkages and intersecting processes among all 
states and peoples of the world.”). 
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society. In other words, I seek to explore the legitimacy of 
intervention from the perspectives of the outside actor and of the 
insider beneficiary or victim of the intervention. It is, after all, the 
particularized interests of these groups, not the abstractions of an 
over-imagined—if not illusory—“international community” that are 
ultimately at stake and which therefore drive the discussions.  Finally, 
Part III explores the light that contemporary legal and philosophical 
stances on intervention sheds on a central interest of Professor 
Richardson’s scholarship (and mine as well): namely, the place of 
power in shaping, defining and legitimizing the legally acceptable.13 
The focus here is on seeking to explain and understand the shift that 
philosophies of interventionism have undergone during the last 
quarter century: from the covert and (if reluctantly) use of 
intervention as a subterfuge for the exercise of power to the overt and 
avowedly unapologetic argument for intervention in the service of 
some asserted greater universal good. 
I.     THREE FACES OF INTERVENTION DISCOURSES  
As is all too often the case in the humanities, a term is as likely 
as not to divide as to unify those who deploy it. Indeed, the ambiguity 
of meaning may be essential in order to permit those temporary but 
convenient alliances of interests and flexible coalitions without which 
virtually no complex society can function. Language thus exhibits a 
paradox. It must obscure its true meaning in order to permit 
temporary alliances. But that meaning must be susceptible of constant 
interrogation and reinterpretation if it is to avoid becoming irrelevant 
in a world of shifting interests, coalitions and arrangements. This is 
the paradox that is indisputably evident in attempting to give meaning 
to the concept of intervention. It is the paradox whose threads this 
part seeks to disentangle by examining the concept of intervention as 
it appears in three domains: the moral; the political; and the legal. 
First, let me provide a general statement of the concept that informs 
the pursuit of the disentanglement in all three epistemological realms.    
 
13. As Professor Richardson quite properly frames the issue: 
“An inescapable inquiry arising from this constitutive question is whether 
regarding intervention—however we define it—international law has 
ceased to reflect and bless the raw patterns of power, domination, 
subordination and race that it did structure and bless for some four 
centuries, prior to confirming the formal illegality of European and other 
colonialism in the mid-twentieth century.”  
Richardson, supra note 3, at 14.   
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At core, the idea of “intervention” implicates the propriety of the 
involvement of an outsider in the matters of another. There are 
certainly instances in which such involvement would be accepted not 
only as permissible, but indeed necessary. Not to intervene in such 
instances would be considered irresponsible, if not an outright wrong. 
But that in order to flourish, the “self” must be allowed some degree 
of autonomous existence (that is, independence of the self in the 
management of one’s own affairs from interference by others, 
however well intended), is equally indisputable. Drawing the 
boundaries of permissible involvement and those of impermissible 
interference is the project of any discourse on “intervention.14 This is 
a discourse that is no less applicable to issues relating to the 
autonomy of the individual or family, as it is to that of the society, 
state or community. At issue in these cases is the appropriate level of 
the involvement of an outsider in the self-realization of the person 
being acted upon. To frame the issue in this way is to introduce a 
second element of “intervention”; that is, the idea of involvement 
carries with it the propriety of the means with which the involvement 
is undertaken. Conduct that may be deemed proper if peacefully, 
quietly, or respectfully promoted, may be considered improper if 
noisily or coercively carried out. Similarly, even coercive conduct 
that at first glance may appear improper may be legitimate if 
undertaken in the exercise of legally conferred rights. Here, I want to 
briefly articulate frameworks for exploring the boundaries of the 
permissible and the impermissible when the other seeks to insert 
itself into the province of the self. 
A.    The Moral Dimensions of Intervention 
That we are each the other’s keeper is as close to a universally 
acknowledged moral imperative as there is.15 As John Dunne’s 
opening epigram to this essay nicely illustrates, the enfolding of 
one’s life in the affairs of the other is at once both ontological and 
 
14. There might be, of course, areas of overlapping uncertainties; that is, when 
it might be impossible to say categorically that involvement is permissible or 
impermissible.  It is precisely for this reason that is essential not only to view the 
problem through different lenses, but to be clear-eyed as to the optics of the 
commentator’s perception. 
15. The idea of “the moral” as used here refers to a belief in the existence of an 
intrinsic “right” and “wrong” that is internal to the self.  This criterion is 
necessarily subjective. 
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deontological. The instinct for self-development and self-preservation 
compels that we look out for our neighbors both as an expression of 
our moral worthiness and as a means for safeguarding the well-being 
of the other. The realization of both goals, it is generally thought, 
contribute to the happiness and ultimate well-being of the self.16   
Involvement in the affairs of the other is thus justifiable as a 
moral undertaking circumscribed by two factors: the extent to which 
we are in fact motivated by the need to address the travails of the 
other, and the means that one chooses for doing so. But even 
presuming good intentions, one may nonetheless be concerned about 
the consequences of the intervention in terms of whether it 
undermines or promotes these dual but interrelated objectives. While 
the ultimate goal of what is morally proper is the satisfaction of the 
predilections of the self, that satisfaction cannot exist in the absence 
of the protection of the welfare of the other. Often, this requires a 
focus on the means employed to bring about the intersections of the 
interests of the self and of the other. Thus, a means that reduces the 
capacity of the other autonomously to make decisions for her own 
welfare may be deemed morally unacceptable even when it would 
appear to enhance the capacity of the self. Here, however, 
examination of those means often occur less through the prism of 
morality than that of politics.   
But can intervention be discussed as a moral construct without 
viewing it as an imperative?  Put another way, morality surely 
requires intervention in appropriate cases, just as much as it forbids it 
in appropriate cases. Yet, rarely do proponents of intervention on 
moral grounds see it in binary divisions. Even while vigorously 
urging intervention, the “right” to engage in it is almost always 
presented in permissive terms. There almost always is a claimed 
space for discretion: a situation where the self is free to intervene or 
to withhold intervention.  
B.    Intervention as a Political Construct 
The dominant ethos through which intervention is considered 
and evaluated is frequently that of the political. This is because 
 
16. It may be questioned whether the moral element is also implicated if, as an 
ontological fact, looking out for the other imposes pain or cost rather than pleasure 
on the self.  Since the moral debate on intervention in contemporary western 
societies is never framed as a command to intervene (only as “right” to intervene), 
providing an answer to the question is thus readily avoided.    
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politics offers tools for the practical exploration of both of the moral 
considerations just presented: motivation and means. The 
environment for the exploration, however, is the polity rather than the 
person. Under this rubric, in matters of consequence for the idea of 
intervention, the self that matters is that constituted by and through 
politics. The nation state is, in our contemporary environment, the 
quintessential expression of the political community. International 
relations are of course premised on recognizing and accepting the 
interdependence of nation states and their constitution into a 
cooperative community. As Professor Richardson rightly observes, 
the international or “global” society is indeed a community because 
of the extant “factual linkages and intersecting processes” that bind 
peoples and states, and which crisscross trans-boundary relationships. 
To that extent, then, it is impossible to view the nation state in 
isolation and to take seriously any argument that frames the 
permissibility of intervention in terms of the absence of involvement 
by one state in the affairs of another. Indeed, cogent arguments for 
affirmative interventionist policies can be advanced for much of the 
same set of reasons that frame the moral argument for the self being 
involved with the other; that is, that trans-boundary involvements are 
necessary simultaneously to procure, secure and preserve the welfare 
of the self as well as of the other.   
The state, however, is not a unitary or atomistic entity; certainly, 
as a political entity, it cannot and should not be considered as having 
a singular and wholly aggregated existence. The propriety of the 
involvement of one state in the affairs of another thus implicates 
measures of welfare—both of the self and of the other—that are 
absent in the uncomplicated morality equation. Defining the self and 
the other in the context of the state demands disaggregating a myriad 
of factors that typically are taken as givens in the moral setting. For 
example, how is “self-interest”—let alone the interest of the other—
to be determined? How are plural interests to be weighed and 
balanced? What criteria are to be employed in evaluating the efficacy 
of costs incurred in intervening in the affairs of the other, the 
effectiveness of the returns on those costs, and the distributions of the 
costs and returns? Politics provides much more satisfactory answers 
to these questions because unlike morality, it is not internal to the 
self. Rather, politics necessarily engages the self with the other not by 
appeal to some internal rule of the self, but through negotiated and/or 
coerced interactions among the self and the other. The political prism 
thus evaluates intervention through a much more complex set of 
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standards and values than does a morally-channeled focus. The prism 
is sufficiently capacious to embrace even seemingly disparate values 
and standards as expediency, pragmatism, efficacy, and principle. 
The morality of the self may prefer one over the other, but the politics 
of the community accepts their possible coexistence, however 
uneasily or unsteadily the relationships might be. 
C.    Law as an Ordering Principle 
Into the seeming chaos of possibilities offered up by politics, the 
legal framework steps in as an ordering principle. Like politics, but 
unlike morality, law offers a prism for decision-making that is 
externally induced rather than internally reflective. Law goes beyond 
politics by insisting on a binding set of routines that are not driven by 
the exigencies of pragmatism. Pragmatic considerations may be 
relevant—as indeed may moral ones as well – but such 
considerations do not trump established routines or bend to exigent 
concerns. The value of the legal prism lies in the analytical structure 
that it brings to what might otherwise appear to be free-flowing and 
entirely subjective decision-making. The routine of legal analysis 
requires identifying an operational text, evaluating that text against 
the backdrop of the operational environment of the text, and testing 
adherence or compliance with the requirements of the text by those 
subject to its prescriptions.  It is to these tasks that the next part turns. 
II.   THE LAW OF INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 
International law has a reasonably well-defined text (or, more 
accurately, series of texts) for the regulation of intervention by one 
state or group of states in the affairs of another. That text is the 
product of the rich and dynamic history of relations among states and 
the peoples they represent. Indeed, the foundational tale of not only 
contemporary international law, but of modern international relations 
not infrequently begins by reciting how the princes and potentates of 
Europe, worn out from thirty-years of chaotic wars over religion and 
rights of monarchical succession decided to reconstruct their 
relationships with each other by prohibiting the interference by one 
prince in the affairs of the other.17 To be sure, the agreement was 
often honored in its breach (as in the Napoleonic wars of 1798-1815 
 
17. The Treaty of Westphalia, signed in 1648, has long been understood as the 
foundation of modern international relations. See John W. Foster, The Evolution of 
International Law, 18 YALE L.J. 149, 153–55 (1909). 
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and the various Ottoman and Balkan conflicts of the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries), but the understanding (or, more accurately, 
the mindset that it generated) provided a standard by which the 
conduct of monarchs outside of their principalities, empires and 
kingdoms could be judged.18 That standard, which lay somewhere in 
the interstices of law and of politics, gave rise to and reproduced 
three intertwined forces in the Europe-centered world history and 
international law of the succeeding three centuries, and which 
continue to exert critical influences after the diffusion of European 
power following World War II. These forces were “nationalism,” 
“balance of power alliances,” and “self-determination.” It is easy 
enough to conclusorily present these forces in binary positive or 
negative terms, but in reality they represented complex amalgams, 
understandings of which are necessary in order to meaningfully 
evaluate of the various doctrines of intervention that remain extant.  
In nationalism, the “nation state” asserted the right to embody 
and to represent the sole and material interests of a people or group of 
peoples.19 That right had its justification in history, whether 
mythologized or real. The right was framed by and asserted against 
the existence of the rights of other peoples, each in turn seen as being 
represented by a separate entity with its own distinctive and divergent 
interests. Shared governance, geography, culture, and experiences 
were seen as glues of statehood. Nationalism thus asserted that right 
vis-à-vis other nation states, and it insisted a reciprocal commitment 
of unalloyed loyalty from the members of the group. The shield of 
non-interference inherent in the Westphalian structure gave to the 
emerging nation-states of Europe a wall of national identity behind 
which “patriotism” could be fostered, and experiments in leadership, 
governance and democracy could be tried out. The experiments and 
the realities they produced were by no means peaceful events, but 
 
18. This rule of “noninterference” was not viewed by Europe as applying to 
events outside of the continent. Africa was partitioned and colonized without 
regard to the rule, and the United States’ announcement of the Monroe doctrine 
notwithstanding, Europe felt perfectly comfortable interfering at on whim and at 
will in the affairs of Latin American and Asian states, as did the United States. 
19. The literature on nationalism is rich and extensive. Illustrative are: 
BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES (3d ed. 2006) (noting that nations 
are creations of modern communication networks); ERIC HOBSBAWM, NATIONS 
AND NATIONALISM SINCE 1780 (1992) (detailing the history of nationalism); 
ANTHONY MARX, FAITH IN NATION: EXCLUSIONARY ORIGINS OF NATIONALISM 
(2003) (arguing that European nationalism began earlier than previously thought).    
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they did result in the strong institutional affiliations of nationhood 
that is now the envy of many emerging states.   
There necessarily were variations in the successes and failures of 
nationality-based state formations. These depended, for example, on 
the wisdom or foolishness of the ruler, the cohesiveness of the 
population, its capacities for industry and for tolerance. These 
features in turn often reflected the pull of such sociological, 
historical, and geographical forces as the coherence or lack of 
coherence between imagined and provable histories, the practicalities 
of geographical boundaries and topology, and the existence (or lack) 
of a shared sense of fairness in the apportionment or distribution of 
economic resources and social wellbeing. This picture was 
complicated by the realities of history and politics, which did not 
make the interactions and coexistence of peoples a tidy package.   
The philosophies of science and of commerce which shaped, 
dominated, and were transmitted by the European Enlightenment, in 
theory, should have fundamentally undermined the idea of 
nationalism. Those philosophies, after all, at core contested the 
validity of claims of preordained hierarchies, ineluctable certainties, 
and fixed determinisms in social and political relationships. Far from 
threatening nationalism, however, science and commerce proved to 
be allies in sustaining it, while reshaping its thrust. The internal group 
competition and views of superiority within Europe may have been 
mediated by enlightenment thinking, but scientific discoveries, 
technological advances, and commercial entrepreneurship simply 
expanded the theater of competition from metropolitan Europe to the 
quest for possessions and colonies in Africa and Asia. In these latter 
theaters, the nationalist ethos was given free reign. 
The state as a homogenous entity that was imbued with the 
national spirit may have been a useful fiction, but that fiction quite 
often butted heads with the inconvenient realities of European 
political life. Great European states such as France, Prussia, and even 
Russia may have been expressive of the yearnings and interests of 
dominant nationalities, but the European political order embodied 
interests beyond those of the French or the English to embrace 
minority ethnic and confessional groups in such multinational and 
multiconfessional empire states as Austro-Hungary and Ottoman 
Turkey. Indeed, one of the consequences of the Napoleonic wars was 
to reveal the shallowness of the fiction of equating nationality with 
the state. The century following the Congress of Vienna can readily 
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be summarized as the century of European defragmentation and 
consolidation. Nationalism was decisive to the process, but it played 
out in quite complicated ways. For example, the idea of German 
nationality at best provided an unsatisfactory explanation for the 
contiguous existence of the Hansiatic states alongside the Austro-
Hungarian Empire and the Prussian state. While Holland may have 
been expressive of Dutch nationality, no such singularity of shared 
nationality interests could comfortably explain the treatment of 
Belgium, Spain, Switzerland, or a host of other entities as states. The 
idea of Greek nationality may have been a romantic rallying cry for 
supporting that country’s war of independence from Ottoman 
suzerainty, but it proved to be an unreliable basis for creating nation 
states out of the Balkan territories and provinces that the Ottoman 
Empire was compelled to divest at the twilight of its existence. The 
defragmentation of the Ottoman Empire, in particular, severely 
tested—as had the reign of Napoleon Bonaparte—the ethos of non-
intervention. To Europe’s credit, however, the idea of non-
intervention was not enshrined as a legal principle. It was at best a 
political concept that shaped behavior as a matter of courtesy. 
Nationalism may have provided the glue for cementing—and in 
some instances creating—great states, but it also nurtured among 
minority groups within multinational empires the yearning for the 
expression of their separate identities through the formation of their 
own nation states. Thus emerged the notion of self-determination 
that, in the twentieth century, came to be formulated as a “right.” 
Meanwhile, in the nineteenth– and early–twentieth centuries, the 
defragmentation ethos allied itself with the ethos of the balance of 
power politics to create a European society of states that preached 
noninterference while unavoidably engaging in interventionist 
politics. The expedient character of nationality-based relations meant 
that intervention often came into play either to protect ethnic or 
religious minorities in a multiethnic state or to forestall such 
intervention by others. In the absence of authoritative norms or 
principles for determining when such intervention was necessary, and 
given the possibly existential consequence of a misjudged 
intervention, states often formed ad hoc coalitions to sponsor or to 
prevent intervention. Some of the best-known European statesmen of 
the nineteenth century—Talleyrand, Metternich, Disraeli, and 
Bismarck, among others—gained their reputations from the skill or 
craftiness they have been adjudged to have shown in their 
manipulation of these crises-driven temporary alliances. There were 
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of course other factors that went into alliance building, but the 
capacities of minority groups within empires and of minor national 
states to play off major powers against each other provided a singular 
source of stability within the European system. The faltering of the 
essential balancing act on which the system was built has been 
accepted as one of the major causes of the First World War.20  
Unsurprisingly, a response to “the Great War” (whose century 
anniversary is now at hand) was to seek to rationalize the conflicting 
interactions of the forces of nationalism, self-determination, and 
balance of power by replacing the last with the concept of “collective 
security.” Where competition among groupings of states had failed to 
tame nationalism, entrusting the task of intervention to a collective 
body—the Council of the League of Nations—was offered as a 
panacea.21 The Council however proved ineffectual – indeed 
irrelevant – in containing the nationalist and imperial drive of such 
states as Germany, Italy, and Japan, and the result was yet another 
“world war.”  
In the ensuing peace arrangement, reflected in the Charter of the 
United Nations system, international society undertook to regulate 
both structurally and substantively the interventionist impulses that 
had given rise to two world wars. At the substantive level, the Charter 
declared as a foundational principle of international law the “right” of 
a people to self-determination.”22 At a minimum, this implied a 
people retained the capacity to avoid the subordination of their 
interests to those of another group. Although the means for the 
exercise of the right was not spelled out in the charter, the post-war 
process of decolonization, heavily relying as it did on the normative 
force of the right suggested a wide latitude for the construction of the 
right. Thus, the process could take the form of peacefully negotiated 
constitutional arrangements, or through so-called “wars of national 
liberation.” In either case, self-determination there involved the 
removal of the subjugation of “natives” by outside imperial powers 
 
20. See generally CHRISTOPHER CLARK, SLEEPWALKERS: HOW EUROPE WENT 
TO WAR IN 1914 (2012) (discussing the origins of World War I); MARGARET 
MACMILLAN, THE WAR THAT ENDED PEACE: THE ROAD TO 1914 (2013) 
(discussing the main people and personalities involved in World War I). 
21. League of Nations Covenant art. 11 (“Any war or threat of war…is hereby 
declared a matter of concern to the whole League…”). 
22. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2. 
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and the rights of the natives to form nation states of their own, a 
process that has been referred to as “external self-determination.”23  
Alongside the declaration of the principle of self-determination, 
the Charter also required member states of the United Nations system 
to refrain from challenging the territorial integrity or political 
independence of other states through the use of force or the threat of 
the use of force.24 This restriction was further extended to apply to 
the system, which is explicitly forbidden from interfering in the 
“domestic” affairs of a state, subject to a narrow exception for when 
the Security Council acts under the authorization of Chapter VII of 
the Charter.25 Furthermore, it became accepted that the prohibition 
against a member state forcibly interfering in the internal affairs of 
another is not merely one under treaty law, but that it is an element of 
customary international law, perhaps one rising up to the status of a 
jus cogens norm.26  
Understanding the boundaries of the regulation of intervention 
under international law following World War II thus entails 
appreciation of the shifting balance that participants in the 
international system sought to strike among competing principles of 
recognition. The view emerged that a people constituting a territorial 
state had a legal right to political independence that was insulated 
from interference by other states and by the international system as a 
whole. That right was protected under the principle of collective 
security, and is therefore subject to the overriding concern of the 
system with maintaining international peace and security. The nation 
state, under the banner of self-determination, emphasized the claim to 
be left alone to manage her politics free of interference from others. 
Within the polity, however, subgroups, invoking the same principle 
of self-determination and proto-nationalism, either asserted the right 
to form a territorial state of their own, or to substitute governance 
provided by their own group over that of the existing government. In 
disclaiming the right of intervention in both situations, the 
international legal order relied exclusively on the extent to which 
international security was compromised by the claims of the national 
 
23. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, ¶ 126 (Can.). 
24. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
25. Id., art. 2, para. 7. 
26. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. 
v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 190 (June 27). 
2014]    RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR RICHARDSON’S KEYNOTE 63 
groups. It feigned indifference to the sources of the internal insecurity 
within the state, and it pretended that the claims or interests of other 
states, however adversely affected, provided no justification for 
external involvement. Such wilful ignorance could be justified only if 
international society did in fact practice collective security.   
The realities of the post-World War II world, however, in 
creating a bipolar regime of alliances, more approximated the balance 
of power system than that of collective security. Far from letting 
internal conflicts resolve themselves, external actors viewed them 
through the lens of their effects in the division of power between the 
West and the East. Indeed, internal conflicts were sometimes 
fomented by the one power or the other in order to provide leverage 
in the struggle between Western “democratic capitalism” and “soviet-
led communism.” And so, in a world in which under international 
law societies supposedly were left to address their internal politics 
free from outside interference, there were nonetheless such well 
known cases of external intervention as Iran in 1953, Guatemala in 
1954, Hungary in 1956, Cuba in 1961, Dominican Republic in 1965, 
Czechoslovakia in 1968, Zaire in 1978, Afghanistan in 1979, 
Granada in 1982, Nicaragua-El Salvador in 1981-1983, and Panama 
in 1989. These examples are usually advanced as illustrating the 
failings of non-intervention as a legal doctrine because it did not 
prevent the big powers from doing what they could, while letting the 
weak suffer because they must. Yet, the doctrine of non-intervention 
has also been criticized for providing a shield for inaction and 
indifference in such cases as Indonesia (1965) and Biafra (1967-
1970). Other instances such as Pakistan/Bangladesh (1973-1974), 
Cyprus (1974), Lebanon (1975-1982), Cambodia (1979-1980), and 
Uganda (1980) have generated significantly differing reactions. 
Whatever else may thus be said about the doctrine of non-
intervention in the post-World War II world, the absence of instances 
of its application was not one of its features. And this conclusion can 
be reached based solely on the known instances of forcible 
intervention. Yet, there certainly were other instances of intervention 
that were undertaken covertly, and whose histories are yet to be 
disclosed. For example, while United States involvement in the 
change of the Mosadegh Government in Iran is no longer disputed, 
that is simply a consequence of fortuitous disclosures.27 Extant 
evidence in such cases as Congo (1960), South Vietnam (1963), and 
 
27. See generally STEPHEN KINZER, ALL THE SHAH’S MEN (2008) (discussing 
the 1953 C.I.A. coup in Iran, the rule of the Shah, and the rise of Islamic 
fundamentalism in Iran).  
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Afghanistan (1980-1989) provide support for claims of covert 
forcible action. While it is generally accepted that the non-
intervention prohibited under the charter is one that involves the use 
of force,28 there is no reason to doubt that the charter prohibits the 
covert application of force as readily as it does its overt use. Yet, the 
covertness of an intervention may have the fallback virtue of 
plausibly sustaining the normative force of the prohibition.  
These numerous examples of forcible interventions 
notwithstanding, the persistence of the doctrine of noninterference as 
prescribed in the UN Charter can and has been vigorously defended, 
so much so that the doctrine has been claimed to be a jus cogens 
norm. The breadth of the acceptance of the principle, rather than a 
tallying up of its breaches, it can be argued, is the preferable indicator 
of its worth. An offender, it can be said, did not protest the existence 
of the principle, but instead invariably sought to justify the violation 
by appeal to a recognizable exception. The most obvious was that no 
actual interference had occurred. Because the language of Article 
2(4) speaks of “the use of force” or “threat of the use of force” that 
violates the “territorial integrity or political independence” of a state, 
it was not uncommon to contend that no use of force was involved, or 
that such force was not directed at the territorial integrity or political 
independence of a state. The supply of weaponry or the use of 
sanctions—economic and/or military—was portrayed as being 
outside of the scope of the prohibition.29 In those instances where the 
use of force was indisputable, the two most common justifications 
were that the intervention was in fact not an intervention because the 
outside force had been invited by a duly constituted government of 
the state (even where that government was brought about through 
outside pressure),30 or that the force was an exigent measure 
 
28. E.g., Lori F. Damrosch, Politics Across Borders: Nonintervention and 
Nonforcible Influence Over Domestic Affairs, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 3 (1989). 
29. Cf. Comment, The Use of Nonviolent Coercion: A Study In Legality Under 
Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 983 (1974) 
(discussing the rejection of a Brazilian proposal to extend article 2(4) to include 
economic coercion). 
30. There are many examples of this throughout the 20th century.  To name a 
few: the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian Revolution in 1956; Soviet invasion 
to halt Czech reform measures in 1968; Vietnamese support in Cambodia of newly 
created “Peoples Republic of Kampuchea” in 1978;  and invasion in support of pro-
Soviet government in Afghanistan (1979).  In comparison, the United States’ war 
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necessary to protect or safeguard foreign nationals within the territory 
of a disintegrating state.31 Rarely did states candidly acknowledge 
that some necessity not contemplated or provided for under the 
prohibition might be in play. The doctrine of nonintervention thus 
came to be accepted as a cardinal rule of international law, even as it 
was frequently violated. 
The story thus far told of the post-World War II order only takes 
one up to the end of the 1980s. The world made a new by the victors 
of that war was substantially revised in the throes of the collapse of 
one of its primary victors, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 
That collapse was viewed and treated as the final—if overly 
delayed—triumph victory of the post-World War II era:  a victory not 
simply of values, but also of political governance, economics, and of 
military might.32 As was the case at the conclusion of World War II, 
the victors of the post-Cold War order felt empowered to dictate the 
terms of the peace, and to reorder the “new world” in its own image. 
Part of that reordering has been the reinterpretation of the concept of 
intervention, and with that reinterpretation, a reexamination of the 
underlying forces of nationalism, self-determination and collective 
security. 
III.  INTERVENTION AND THE NEOLIBERAL WORLD ORDER 
If the treaty of Westphalia heralded the ascendance of liberalism 
as an organizing concept in international relations, the international 
system over the last quarter century has been shaped by a modified 
form of liberalism that is fairly characterized as “neoliberal.” 
Classical liberalism had as its focus the prescription of workable 
principles for the constitution and governance of the state. Its primary 
focus was on the distribution of rights and responsibilities within the 
polity. Its application to international relations, while not 
inconsequential, was that of a second order process.  s previously 
explained, the prohibition on intervention was as much intended to 
 
in Vietnam was authorized in reaction to the “Gulf of Tonkin Incident” —an 
alleged attack by the North Vietnamese Navy in 1964. 
31. Examples of this justification can be found in the U.S. occupation of the 
Dominican Republic in 1965 and the U.S. invasion of Granada in 1982. 
32. For an assessment and critique of this take on the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union, see JACK F. MATLOCK JR., SUPERPOWER ILLUSIONS: HOW MYTHS 
AND FALSE IDEOLOGIES LED AMERICA ASTRAY – AND HOW TO RETURN TO 
REALITY (2010) (arguing that the collapse of the Soviet Union weakened American 
power). 
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further the internal development of the polity as it was to create a 
harmonious international society. The principle of non-intervention 
was thus a secondary product of state building. The principle 
operated in the political sphere, and did not take on its legal character 
until the period following World War I.33 Neoliberalism, on the other 
hand, seeks to apply aggressively and extraterritorially the ideals that 
classical liberalism had enunciated for the internal constitution and 
governance of the state.  Its proponents have crafted the doctrine 
explicitly for the purpose of creating a particularized structure of 
international society. Neoliberalism sees the liberal ideal not as a 
work-in-progress, but a completed structure that needs only to be 
transplanted and cemented into those societies currently lacking its 
foundations. Similarly, membership in international society, and the 
distribution of rights and privileges within the society are based on 
the extent to which a national society is seen to have fully absorbed 
the elements of neoliberalism.   
Precisely because of its proselytizing mission, neoliberalism 
necessarily privileges interventionism. Neoliberalism has done so, 
however, without rewriting the post-World War II legal text. To the 
contrary, it has kept essentially intact the text of undifferentiated 
equal national sovereignties.34 While ostensibly accepting the legal 
doctrine of nonintervention, neoliberalism in practice has sought to 
reorder international society through actions that in fact and in 
practice selectively reinterpret and rewrite the text of non-
interventionism. Neoliberalism squares the circle of seemingly 
adhering to an unchanged legal text while radically reforming 
expected behavior by centering and indeed essentializing the 
contemporary European (or “Western”) experience.  
Two world wars made evident to Europe the futility—or at least 
the limits—of nationalism. Similarly, self-determination proved to be 
no solution to the intractable issues of political independence and 
national sovereignty. To the contrary, the experiences of former 
European colonies, coupled with the integrating ethos of an emerging 
European identity suggested that nationalism and self-determination 
had become outmoded and certainly not satisfactory grounds for an 
 
33. See supra Part II. 
34. For a nuanced exploration of this central concept of international law, see 
GERRY SIMPSON, GREAT POWERS AND OUTLAW STATES (2004) (examining the role 
of Great Powers and outlaw states in an international context). 
2014]    RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR RICHARDSON’S KEYNOTE 67 
international order that increasingly privileged the human rights of 
the individual over the purported national rights of the state. Rather 
than protecting the person by shielding the collective from outside 
interference, the emerging European experiment—emphasizing as it 
did, free movements across national territorial boundaries—amply 
demonstrated that the person is more secure when her ties to the 
collective are viewed as elastic and pragmatic. Neoliberalism thus 
fostered the internationalization of these insights which could only 
enrich individual liberty in otherwise authoritarian societies or 
dictatorial regimes. 
But applying the lessons of the European experience to other 
societies has turned out not to be entirely salutary. The difficulties—
indeed contradictions—of changing legal rules through selective 
practice rather than through a conscious rewrite of the text of the 
rules may be best demonstrated by a brief survey of interventionist 
moments in the post-Cold War period and in distilling the lessons 
they suggest for an understanding of current views on intervention. 
In the aftermath of the disintegration of the Communist-led 
governments of Eastern Europe, the international order, in spite of its 
rhetoric of “universalism,” in fact adhered to a practice of ideological 
segmentation.  The blocs conveniently may be classified into four 
groupings of states.  In the first were the continuing heirs of 
Westphalia and of liberalism. The core states in this block were in 
Western Europe and North America, but also included a handful of 
other rich industrial states, notably in Asia.  Its center of gravity was 
the United States, and backed up by the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, this was by far the most influential block. It possessed 
the certainty of correctness that is conferred by success. It had not 
only the economic and military resources with which to propagate its 
views, but the intellectual foundations as well. Above all else, it 
confronted a demoralized cohort of rudderless states that hitherto had 
constituted enemies in a bipolar division of the world. For these 
states, the certainty of moral rectitude combined with political 
capacity to create legal legitimacy.  
The second group of states was made up of the erstwhile 
opposition block consisting of communist-led European societies.  
Politics in these societies revealed profound fractures between the 
leaders and the ruled that had been submerged under communism. A 
reawakened “civil society” seemed determined to reassert a heritage 
of the classical liberal ideas that were interrupted by the two world 
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wars. This group of states viewed themselves as much heirs to the 
European enlightenment as were the West European states. Like 
reformed proponents of a creed, their zeal in announcing and 
promoting the good news of modern liberalism matched—if it did not 
exceed—that of their cousins in the first group.  What they lacked in 
physical resources was made up, however, by appeal to experience. 
Any doubt as to the superiority of neoliberalism could always be laid 
to rest by the testimonials of the successes of the second in the 
transition from illiberal to liberal democracies and market capitalism. 
The third group of states had constituted the core of the 
nonaligned states in a bipolar world. Pragmatic in outlook and 
uncommitted to any hard and fast ideology these states drawn 
primarily from what was referred to as “the third world” had, through 
their sheer numbers, sustained the balance of power in the 
international system through much of the 1960s and 1970s.  Their 
support had been courted by both of the ideological blocs of the Cold 
War, even as they themselves sought to focus attention on the 
generation and distribution of wealth across borders.  Drawn 
predominantly from Africa, Asia, and Latin America, the economic 
crises of the 1980s had greatly diminished the capacity of many of 
the states in this group to maintain the independence of action that 
they had so flamboyantly exhibited in the preceding two decades.35 
The disintegration of the Communist ideological bloc, coupled with 
the weak economic state many of these countries faced at the 
beginning of the 1990s with rare exceptions sidelined them in the 
emerging post-Cold War politics of international relations. In 
particular, they proved incapable of providing a countervailing 
response to the practical rewriting of the doctrine of non-intervention. 
The current rewriting of the practice of intervention has occurred 
primarily in terms of relations with and within a fourth group of 
states. The group has been carved out almost exclusively from the 
third group (with a handful sharing similar experiences to some states 
in the second group); a phenomenon that itself deserves some 
attention. This fourth group of states is characterized by internal 
instability, but that is hardly a sufficient distinguishing feature.  Many 
 
35. Cf. David Fidler, Revolt Against or From Within the West? TWAIL, the 
Developing World, and the Future Direction of International Law, 2 CHINESE J. 
INT’L L. 29 (2003) (discussing the rise of “Third World” challenges to Western 
hegemony in modern international law). 
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of the states in the second and third groups have, over the course of 
the last twenty-five years experienced instances of instability. The 
sort of instability at play in the fourth group is what might be termed 
“state collapse” or “state failure.” Whether intervention is in fact the 
cause or the effect of that failure is not always clear; what is 
evident—and clearly distinguishes the fourth group from the third—
is the unapologetic claim for intervention that has emerged within 
policy-shaping and policy-making circles in the West, and as 
suggested by events in Crimea-Ukraine, perhaps in a re-energized 
East as well.  
The “no apologies” (or “aggressive”) disregard of non-
interventionism over the last quarter-century has not of course been 
without reasonable justification. The question raised by the new 
approach is whether the textual rules ought not to be rewritten, or at 
least given formal reinterpretation. The answer may well lie in a 
closer look at some of the instances that have led to the intervention, 
and determining whether these instances are unique so that justified 
intervention in the particular case should be seen as aberrational, or 
whether these instances of state collapse meriting intervention may 
be sufficiently widespread that the rules of intervention—if they are 
not to be a mockery of themselves—ought to be rewritten. 
The first significant indication of a change in attitude about the 
legal rules on intervention was manifested in the reaction to the 
international society’s involvement in the governance of Somalia. In 
1992, the UN Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the 
organization’s charter, authorized external intervention in what was 
entirely a domestic conflict among admittedly armed factions within 
the country.36 The Council purported to be acting within the narrow 
carve out in the Organization’s Charter for lawful involvement in the 
internal affairs of a member state. The justification offered for the 
intervention was “humanitarian,” a rationale that a decade later was 
to be renamed “the responsibility to protect” (R2P).37 But it is 
 
36. S.C. Res. 794, U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (Dec. 3, 1992) (authorizing UN 
intervention in Somalia). 
37. See generally ANNE ORFORD, INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY AND THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (2011) (discussing the idea that the international 
community has an obligation to proect at-risk populations); See Alyse Prawde, The 
Contribution of Brazil's 'Responsibility while Protecting' Proposal to the 
'Responsibility to Protect' Doctrine, 29 MD. J. INT’L L. 184 (2014). Cf. Ruth 
Gordon, Saving Failed States: Sometimes a Neocolonialist Notion, 12 AM. U. INT’L 
L. & POL’Y 903 (1997). 
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impossible to understand the Somali intervention outside of the then 
emerging hubris of a proclaimed “new world order.” Having 
surprisingly acted in concert to reverse the invasion of Kuwait by 
Iraq— indisputably an international conflict that threatened 
international peace and security—the Security Council under the 
unquestioned leadership of the United States felt empowered to act in 
ways hitherto unknown to it. Somalia seemed to present on its face an 
easy case; the conjunction of a minimal call on resources, the purest 
of motives (verging on the altruistic), and a highly likely successful 
outcome. But Somalia did not turn out successfully. Indeed, the 
reverberations of the intervention continue as these lines are written.   
When Rwanda next presented a “humanitarian” case for 
intervention, international society shied away from too close an 
involvement in the resolution of that internal conflict, even though 
there were United Nations “peacekeepers” already on the ground.38 
Hundreds of thousands of Rwandans were killed, and the 
reverberations of those killings continue.  Seemingly paralyzed by 
these two experiences, the UN system stood by in indecision as a 
reinvigorated and assertive NATO, on the fiftieth anniversary of its 
creation, waged an air war against Serbia to compel her to give up 
control of Kosovo, a province with a dominant population of 
Albanians. The reason advanced by NATO and its sponsors was the 
need to forestall an imminent “genocide,” or “ethnic cleansing”; 
although it is virtually impossible to validate this explanation against 
competing ones such as the need to bring the Serbian leader, 
Milosevic to heel for challenging the post-Cold War Order of Europe 
and the Balkans.   
The Kosovo war was a military success. Yet, an influential 
review of its facts and logic concluded that it was an “illegal” if a 
“legitimate” undertaking.39 Presumably, neither the rectitude of moral 
motivations nor military success sufficed to confer legal propriety on 
intervention. This, at any rate, appears to have been the political 
conclusion reached by the heads of states and governments of the 
 
38. See, e.g., ROMEO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL: THE FAILURE 
OF HUMANITY IN RWANDA (2003) (detailing a UN worker’s first-hand account of 
the genocide in Rwanda). 
39. INDEP. INT’L COMM. ON KOSOVO, THE KOSOVO REPORT (2000) available 
at http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/6D26FF88119644CFC125 
6989005CD392-thekosovoreport.pdf. 
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member states of the United Nations system at the turn of the twenty-
first century. Imbued with a millennial spirit for the reconstruction of 
the international legal order, these leaders sought to reconcile the 
growing claim for intervention on humanitarian grounds with the 
preexisting legal prohibition. Doing so required that these politicians 
marry two philosophies that are at odds. In the first, relying on the 
work of a Canadian Government sponsored “independent” panel, 
they had to buy into the idea that humanitarian intervention was 
driven by altruistic motives. Secondly, they were confronted with the 
need to read just their conception of sovereignty as entailing the right 
of each state to determine for itself the terms of the relationship 
between the state and the citizen. The result was the compromise that 
has come to be termed “responsibility to protect.”   
Although the phrase is now routinely deployed to express the 
view that the “international community” has a “responsibility” to 
protect persons threatened by mass atrocities, a straightforward 
reading of the language actually employed makes plain the nature of 
the compromise. First, it reiterates a truism: that all states have the 
obligation to protect the vulnerable members of the society over 
whom the state claims sovereignty or jurisdiction. The RTP 
Declaration simply emphasizes that this incontestable international 
law obligation continues to exist even—and perhaps especially—at 
moments of mass atrocities.40 Secondly, the Declaration recognizes 
and accepts the possibility that a state may be unable to discharge that 
responsibility; in which case, international society cannot rely on the 
shield of state sovereignty to evade stepping into the shoe of the 
ineffectual state.41 Notably, nothing in the declarations of the heads 
of states and governments imposed an affirmative—let alone an 
imperative duty on any external state or group of states to employ the 
use of force against another state on humanitarian grounds. The 
prohibition of forceful intervention, even in so-called humanitarian 
situations, is especially apposite where the conflicts among the 
members of a society go to basic questions of the nature and structure 
 
40. See 2005 World Summit Outcome, ¶ 138, G.A. Res. 60/1, U.N. Doc 
A/RES/60/1 (Sept. 16, 2005). Pointedly, the Resolution emphasizes the standard 
elements of cooperation in international law; the encouragement of pacific means 
for resolving disputes, whether internal or international; and the furnishing of 
assistance by the international society to the state in the latter’s discharge of its 
obligations.   
41. Id. ¶ 139.([The international community]…[is] prepared to take collective 
action…should peaceful means be inadequate…to protect [] populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”). 
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of the arrangements for the internal organization of a state; that is, to 
the source of a state’s claim of sovereignty. But it is almost always in 
these situations that proponents of RTP, imbued with a substantive 
preference for a particular neoliberal outcome, have most often 
clamored for intervention. But it is perhaps unavoidable that in an age 
in which the so-called civil society, having the resources but lacking 
the generalized responsibility and accountability of the nation state, 
has come to play a central role in the definition of international law, 
established principles can be cavalierly reformulated. Such a 
conclusion seems inescapable given the ease with which the language 
of “responsibility to protect” has become interpreted as authorizing 
intervention by foreign states in the overthrow of governments in 
weak states. In any event, proponents of the “responsibility to 
protect” trot it out only in those situations in which they believe that 
the responsibility can be discharged at minimal costs to themselves. 
They do not assert it as a duty to be satisfied in situations where it 
would be at substantial inconvenience or hardship to international 
society or the foreign interloper. 
The debate over humanitarian intervention is of course only a 
subset of the much broader issue of external involvement in the 
internal affairs of a state. If in fact we inhabited a “borderless world” 
in which persons and their governments have equal concern for the 
wellbeing of others without regard to nationality, the question of 
intervention (at least as framed in law through politics) would 
evaporate. But we do not.  Indeed, the countries most likely to insist 
on the continuing force of national borders are those of the wealthy 
West, especially when confronted by the prospects of mass 
immigration from the much poorer rest. Nonintervention—the legal 
rules crafted in an age when legal positivism reigned supreme—
sought to privilege sovereignty as an affirmation of the capacity and 
right of a self-determined population group to engage in self-
government (and indeed misgovernment) free of the shackles of a 
superior society. One of the remarkable features of the post-Cold War 
international order has been the reaffirmation of a particular form of 
self-determination, which in popular parlance we call “democracy.” 
Along with “humanitarian intervention,” the promotion of 
“democracy” has furnished an additional argument for reordering and 
recalibrating the principle of nonintervention. At about the same time 
that neoliberalism was being touted as constituting the “end of 
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history,”42 democracy was being presented as a “human right.”43 The 
elements of the “right” were never comprehensively articulated, but it 
was assumed that they more or less approximated those that were in 
practice in the liberal democracies of the West. Self-determination 
was seen to be available only to a people that were in fact democratic.  
Intervention might be appropriate then not only in furtherance of 
humanitarian norms, but of “democracy,” so defined. Even in the 
absence of the threat of mass atrocities, intervention may be engaged 
in to rid a society of illiberal tendencies and pariah statesmen. The 
currency that appeared to matter was the capacity for successful 
intervention. 
It is against this backdrop that the most recent instances of 
intervention should be evaluated. As it happens, the three that have 
generated the most controversy in the last three years implicate the 
most recognizable three political power centers of contemporary 
international society. These are the intervention by NATO (backed by 
the United Nations) in a Libyan civil war; the attempted intervention 
by an assortment of states in the Syrian civil war; and the ongoing 
civil crisis in Ukraine. Each challenges the continuing force of the 
prohibitions on intervention, even as modified by post-Cold War 
practice. These comments conclude by inquiring whether these 
examples suggest the need for textual clarification of emerging 
doctrines or whether the international system is better off by leaving 
well enough alone. 
Both of the civil wars in Libya and in Syria are archetypes of the 
civil strife that beset much of the non-Western world in the wake of 
decolonization. For these inorganic states brought into being through 
the artificial manipulations of European powers, their current civil 
wars may not be unlike those experienced by and which shaped 
European national societies at the dawn of the modern era. They 
certainly are the sort of civil strife that have beset several post-
colonial African and Asian states over the last two generations. These 
are wars in which population groups, finding themselves in proximity 
to each other, but set apart by such cleavages as religion, clan-based 
kinship relationships, and poorly distributed economic resources 
have, as is all-too-human, sought to restructure their relationships 
 
42. See generally FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST 
MAN (1992) (predicting the collapse of authoritarian regimes in favor of liberal 
democracies). 
43. See, e.g., Thomas Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 
86 AM. J. INT’L L. 46, 46 (1992) (presenting democracy as a “global entitlement”). 
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through violence. In the case of Libya, the dominant cleavage was 
territorial; in Syria, religious. Rwanda, Bangladesh, Biafra, and 
Indonesia, to suggest a few examples, have undergone similar 
experiences. Similarly, alongside the civil wars in Syria and Libya 
were “uprisings” in Tunisia and Egypt, which collectively have come 
to be referred to as “the Arab Spring.” These latter, as in the former, 
again reflected the working out of societal cleavages.  In the latter 
two cases, they have been framed as questions of “modernity” and 
“secularism” in conflict with religious and/or political orthodoxy. In 
short, civil strife in the developing world is best viewed as 
continuation of the struggle to substitute the artificially created 
societies of the colonial era with modern organic communities. It is 
asking too much to hope or believe that the processes of national 
community formation in these societies will be any less violent than 
it had been in Europe.   
What then, it might be asked, distinguishes Libya and Syria from 
the other examples, at least sufficiently so to make them paradigms 
for external intervention? The easy response is to assert that Libya 
and Syria have involved “mass atrocities” or, at least, their 
likelihood. But what made mass atrocities more likely in these two 
states than in the others experiencing socio-political upheavals? An 
equally easy response points to the character of the personalities in 
charge of these countries. Yet any serious evaluation of these 
explanations readily demonstrates their fallacies. The leaderships in 
Syria and in Libya had been in power and with as much contentment 
and dissatisfaction over the forty or so years of their reign, as had the 
leaderships in Tunisia and Egypt. If the leaderships differed among 
themselves, it was in the nature of the external alliances they had 
formed over those years. The Libyan and Syrian rulers had hitched 
their wagons to non-Western horses. They fell into that camp that 
neoliberal internationalists, with unwarranted virtuousness, referred 
to as “rogue” or “pariah states.” Tunisian, Egyptian, and Bahraini 
rulers, on the other hand, had aligned themselves with the West.  No 
sooner had the social uprisings in Libya and Syria commenced than 
leaders in the West openly demanded that these leaders step down. If 
external involvement was confined to demands for “regime change,” 
however impolitic that might have been under the old standards, that 
would hardly in and of itself constitute impermissible intervention.   
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What made intervention in Libya and Syria distinctive was the 
active recourse to the use of force to bring about the overthrow of 
recognized governments. “Responsibility to protect” has been 
invoked as the justifying legal principle, but the chronology of events 
fairly raises the issue of cause and effect. Was the mass violence and 
inchoate mass atrocities in Libya precipitated by or in response the 
externally driven injection of force? Similarly, in the case of Syria, it 
should be asked whether external intervention by the West and the 
Gulf Arab countries through the direct supply of armaments and 
diplomatic support are not responsible for the scale of the violence 
and the substantial loss of lives and sufferings visited on that country. 
Can it be that far from preventing or remedying humanitarian 
catastrophes, the open and notorious interventions encouraged by the 
rhetoric of “responsibility to protect” may be creating the conditions 
for mass atrocities? The logic for finding an affirmative response to 
this question is not hard to see. In the first place, despite the claim of 
disinterested humanitarianism, it takes little tweaking of the 
imagination to see that the selective use of the doctrine serves 
primarily the interest of the outsider.   
It is not accidental that of the four states at issue, the two over 
which assertions of the “right” to engage in a discharge of the so-
called “responsibility” are those with which the outsiders had ulterior 
motives and interests in overthrowing the leadership. Nor is it 
accidental that those who spearheaded the claimed humanitarian 
intervention are countries with historical grievances against the 
leaderships of the countries In which interventions have been 
sought.44 It was precisely concerns over such selective use of force 
 
44. Muammar Qaddafi of Libya had of course been a bête noire in the West 
since his unilateral seizure of crude oil concessions that had been given to the 
Western oil companies. ANTHONY SAMPSON, THE SEVEN SISTERS (1976) 
(discussing and analyzing the history of the world’s largest oil companies). He did 
not endear himself either to the United States or to France by apparently financing 
subversive activities against airlines of both countries.  Similarly, the Assad family 
that had ruled Syria since 1970 had aligned the country during the Cold War with 
the Soviet Union, and unlike other Arab countries, such as Egypt, apparently did 
not switch allegiance to the West even after the collapse of the Soviet Union.  That 
France led the West’s thrusts in both Libya and Syria is especially noteworthy.  As 
early as 2003, in the aftermath of the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq, one of 
France’s most prominent intellectual on foreign affairs sought to carve up the 
projection of Western power between the United States and Western Europe.  
Notably, he argued for collaboration between the United States and France in 
matters of “enlightened intervention” in the Middle-East and Africa. Dominique 
Moïsi, Reinventing the West, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Nov. 1, 2003), 
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that engendered the principles of nationalism and self-determination 
that have underpinned the doctrine of nonintervention. But of even 
more significance, whatever may be one’s position on the causation 
conundrum, there is no denying that in Libya, as in Syria and 
Somalia, the consequences of the purported humanitarian 
intervention has been anything but remedial. All three countries 
continue to experience substantial instability and insecurity. Yet, 
having demonstrated Western might, those who called for 
humanitarian intervention pretty much lose interest in the welfare of 
the locals who are left to endure the consequences of the 
bombardment of their societies. At best, the result of “humanitarian 
intervention” appears to be the interruption of the organic formation 
of the state. Politics within these societies is shown to be dependent 
on outside intervention, which in turn does not last long enough to 
assure return to order. Again, the narrow domestic interests of the 
outside intervener, far more than the internal disorder of the broken 
society determines when help is to be withdrawn.45 Might there be a 
lesson in the indisputable fact that Rwanda, the ignored case for 
humanitarian intervention is proving to be a good deal more resilient 
as a society, and more of an organic state than are Somalia and Libya. 
From the perspective of an international lawyer, surely one of 
the most striking features of the resort to the use of force over the last 
quarter century is the paucity of its examination in legal terms by the 
politicians, policy-makers and academics who ordinarily invoke “the 
rule of law” as a distinguishing feature of life in Western societies. 
Nowhere has the absence of resort to legal arguments been more 
conspicuous by its absence than in the arena of discourses on the 
permissibility of interventions. In both Syria and Libya, as examples, 
it is notable that aside from the suspect justification of humanitarian 




45. An example is the debate over U.S. withdrawal of her forces from Iraq and 
Afghanistan. The debate has been framed primarily in terms of the continuing 
threat, if any, to the United States and the West from lingering “terrorists” in those 
states, not in terms of the security of life, liberty or property for the citizens of 
those states. E.g. Celeste Ward Gventer, Adjusting the War on Terror to Fit the 
Times, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/03/04/fighting-afghan 
-terrorism-without-troops/adjusting-the-war-on-terror-in-afghanistan-to-fit-the-
times (describing anti-terrorism goals in the context of leaving Afghanistan). 
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the most cursory of terms, the propriety under international law of 
external intervention in Libya or in Syria. To be sure, the rhetoric of 
humanitarianism was occasionally invoked, but even here, the 
considerations were presented as self-evidently moral and practical in 
character, not as a discourse on the relevance of law to the decision-
making process. In Syria, for example, despite the claims about 
providing “lethal” and “non-lethal” support, no “fly zones,” and 
“punitive strikes” in “retaliation” for the use of chemical weapons, 
the policy-makers wrestling with these issues did not refer to 
international law as providing any relevant guidance.46 The focus was 
in terms of the practicalities of implementation, and the likely 
effectiveness of the measures as sources of deterrence or of 
retribution. Internal political and military considerations, much more 
than the applicability of international law shaped the discourse.47   
It should therefore gladden the heart of an international lawyer 
when a Western politician like Mr. Obama invokes the legal doctrine 
of nonintervention not as an afterthought, but as the driving 
explanation for a policy preference. This has been the position taken 
by the United States in its critique of Russian behavior in the current 
Crisis over the separation of Crimea from Ukraine and its absorption 
by the Russian Federation. As the United States has contended, a 
“fundamental principle” in play there—as elsewhere—is that the 
Ukrainian people deserve the opportunity to determine their own 
future.”48 That is the basic principle at stake in all cases where an 
outsider feels inclined to intervene in the internal conflict of any 
society. It is a principle that states are not at liberty to grant or 
withhold as they individually see fit.  Rather, it applies to all except 
 
46. About the only exception to this silence was President Barack Obama’s 
terse and dismissive reference to international law in his August 31, 2013 speech: 
“I’m comfortable going forward without the approval of a United Nations Security 
Council that, so far, has been completely paralyzed and unwilling to hold Assad 
accountable”; “If we won’t enforce accountability in the face of this heinous act, 
what does it say about our resolve to stand up to others who flout fundamental 
international rules?” President Barack Obama, Remarks on Syria (Aug. 31, 2013). 
The obvious internal inconsistency in this appeal to legality might be entertaining, 
except that this self-serving framing of international law as no more than the 
expression of U.S. foreign policy preferences has been the hallmark of the 
country’s approach to legality over the last quarter-century.     
47. See id. (“Now, after careful deliberation, I have decided that the United 
States should take military action against Syrian regime targets. . . . We would not 
put boots on the ground. . . . But having made my decision as commander-in-chief 
based on what I am convinced is our national security interests, I am also mindful 
that I am the President of the world’s oldest constitutional democracy”).    
48. President Barack Obama, Statement on Ukraine (Feb. 28, 2014). 
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in the most exceptional of circumstances. As President Obama and 
his agents have aptly summarized the relevant international law 
doctrine, it is the obligation of all states to stand for the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity, political independence, and, if the people so 
choose, the “democratic future” of their state.49 The pity is that these 
pronouncements come not as those of a member of the UN system 
with a principled stance on the doctrine of intervention, but as the 
expedient statement of a politician that has been caught off-guard by 
the capacity of an opponent to resort to the same unprincipled 
conduct and justification in which the West has been engaging for 
quite some considerable time.   
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the West has acted and 
behaved like the colossus that bestrides a narrow world. In the 
process, rather than negotiating the rules of the road in international 
relations, it has tended to lay them down as edicts. Legal rules may 
be formulated through the use of power and political structures, but 
what distinguishes law from both power and politics is that once the 
rule is formulated, it takes a life of its own, and acts to constrain even 
the rule makers. In rewriting the rules of intervention to meet its 
immediate and narrow preferences, the West opened the door to 
Russia to make the arguments that it now advances, and which the 
West now finds unappetizing. In explaining its policies with regard to 
Crimea and Ukraine, Russia essentially mouths three of the same 
platitudes that the West has employed to justify neoliberal 
interventionism. First, the overthrow of an elected Government in 
Kiev by a street mob said to be sponsored or backed by the West 
(according to the Russians) rendered the replacement Government 
illegal and illegitimate. As a result, the predominantly Russian-
speaking population of the Crimea in the application of the principle 
of self-determination was entitled to secede from Ukraine and to seek 
the protection of Russia.  Secondly, the nature of the revolt in the 
Ukraine, mounted in the main by “right-wing nationalists” and 
“fascists” presented a threat to the human rights of the population 
group in Crimea. Third, given past historical associations, the 
Russian Federation retained continuing interests and rights in seeing 
to the well-being of Crimeans. These arguments may differ in their 
particulars from those that have been advanced to explain the role of 
former colonial powers in the interventionist politics of such societies 
 
49. Id. 
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as Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast and even Syria, but it does not take a 
whole lot of stretching to draw analogies among them. The difference 
between 2014 and 1999 lies in Russia feeling empowered to rely on 
such arguments in explaining what might otherwise be thought as a 
clear violation of international law. In doing so it plausibly finds 
precedents in the conduct of Western states and NATO in the last 
quarter century. 
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS:  WHAT IS TO BE DONE? 
As Professor Richardson frames the problem of intervention:  
The major continuing question for international law in 
our Global Village is whether as a dynamic legal 
process of authority and control, it will in its 
decisions, interpretations and large range of actors 
simply reflect the dominant patterns of power and 
control that arise from unappraised sources in the 
Village.  Or, whether its decisions and interpretations 
will normatively aim to steadily shape a better global 
community towards greater sharing of human values 
…”50   
I cannot say that my comments have seriously grappled with the 
binary characterization suggested by this framing of the problem. But 
there is, I think, no denying the dynamic character of international 
law and I hope this Comment has indicated the continuities as well as 
the discontinuities in the international law making process. Whether 
the process is essentially normative in character is, to my mind, 
highly debatable.   
Words have a way of surviving their original usage.  Sovereignty 
and self-determination are two obvious examples, as indeed is 
“intervention.” These terms will continue to be extensively deployed 
in international law. It is equally likely that they will acquire over 
time meanings that are different from their current references.  What 
are bound to remain effectively unaltered are the desires of human 
beings singly and collectively to coexist in an atmosphere of mutual 
support while retaining the right to negotiate their own separate 
futures as they best see fit.  Similarly, contrary to the dominant ethos 
of global society after World War II, the move towards the even 
 
50. Richardson, supra note 3, at 13 (emphasis added). 
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distribution of power and resources is by no means a guaranteed 
success. Indeed, as recent data indicates, while it may be that 
international society is becoming better able to assure the satisfaction 
of minimum basic needs to the vast majority of the population, there 
is little reason to be overly optimistic that the result would be the 
increased convergence rather than continuing (or even widening) 
divergence in the basic allocation and distribution of (again to borrow 
from Professor Richardson) of “basic values” and goods as “power, 
wealth, rights, loyalties, authority and access to global resources.”51 
In international relations, no less than in domestic and private affairs, 
the post-Cold War neoliberal moment has demonstrated that there is 
nothing inexorable about the march toward progress of any particular 
kind. And yet, Professor Richardson is certainly right that all of 
humanity will have to work within a shared global space. There is no 
other choice. The question for intervention in this environment of 
continuing differences within a shared and sometimes 
claustrophobically confining space is how best to modulate the 
inequalities which can be quite glaring. At a minimum, the well-off 
will have to learn that the idea of humanity isn’t simply about 
shaping the world in our preferred image, but genuinely making an 
attempt to understand the constraints within which the less well-off 
live their lives, and recognize and accept that the latter’s values are 
no less worthy of comprehension and deference because of those 
constraints. Societies are organic creations. They do not come into 
being simply because one wills them to exist. Like chains, they are 
only as good as their weakest links, and like any metal, they are 
strengthened through patient tempering and nurturing, not simply by 
constantly being hammered down. But this is no license for 
indifference. One can show concern and interest by seeking to 
persuade rather than to punish. There might be satisfaction and a 
sense of self-fulfillment in the latter, but it is the former that creates 
the grounding for longer-term productive returns on expended 
resources. 
For the purpose of trying to make less abstruse the thoughts 
expressed in the preceding paragraph, reconsider the concept of the 
“responsibility to protect.” Witnessing the mass atrocities of Europe 
prior to and during World War II, and the internal conflicts incident 
to state formation in Africa and Asia after World War II, there is no 
 
51. Id. 
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denying the need to provide mechanisms by which severely 
fragmented societies can address their problems. The text of R2P as 
articulated in the World Summit Conference outcome can hardly be 
faulted as a reasonable attempt to take account of the need for the 
responsibility of nation states to seek to address, in the first instance, 
the sources and causes of their fragmentation. Nor can one seriously 
argue against the requirement that the international system furnish 
whatever encouragement or assistance it can to the government and 
people of the fractured state as they seek to disentangle their society 
from the spider web of civil strife. One can debate the nature and 
scope of that encouragement and assistance, but as long as it remains 
secondary to the primary responsibilities of those whose lives and 
hopes are at stake, no genuine objection seriously can be taken. The 
difficulty with R2P arises with assigning to the international system 
the primary responsibility for restoring peace and security to an 
internally fragmented society. The international system, acting 
through the Security Council, and within the parameters of the 
Chapter VI functions of the Council arguably legitimately and legally 
can contribute to the prevention and protection of a citizenry whose 
government consents. The difficulty arises where the Council—and 
through it the international system—purports to act on its own 
mandate and independently of a functioning government in matters 
that would otherwise constitute an intervention in the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity or political independence of the state. Such 
exercise of power, which commentators in the West have become 
habituated to following the end of the Cold War is likely to continue 
to be resisted by others. The primary reason is the selective character 
of the intervention—probably an unavoidable human trait. But it 
should also be rejected because it denies agency and humanity to 
those whom it ostensibly intends to help. As already explained, the 
record of societies that at some point seemed fragmented beyond 
repair, but which were left to resolve their problems—the Indian sub-
continent, Nigeria-Biafra, and Rwanda, to name a few examples—is, 
by measures of several magnitude, superior to those in which the 
West has felt itself called upon in the name of R2P or like to 
intervene: Somalia, Libya, and Syria. But there remains one possible 
situation in which R2P when narrowly and prudently construed may 
be necessary. It is where the internal fragmentation is so complete 
that there is in fact no Government or state worth its name. This may 
well have been the case in Somalia and possibly in the Central 
African Republic. Here, the principle of nonintervention may be 
inapposite because there is no state or society whose territorial 
integrity or political independence may be worth respecting. But even 
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here, R2P should be resorted to with care. The extent to which data is 
subject to self-deluding interpretation is all too obvious. One could 
have argued that Rwanda would have satisfied this condition in 1994, 
yet, in retrospect, it is obvious that Rwandans were perfectly capable 
of muddling through their problems and emerging at the end of it a 
much more solidified society. 
